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Abstract 
This study examines the relation between dividends and financial 
constraints to firm value using publicly traded firms in Indonesia 
from 2013 to 2017. The very exploration used a repeated cross 
section regression method to understand monotonic and non-
monotonic alliance between dividends and financial constraints to 
firm value. The non-monotonic correlation measured by dummy 
variables for 6 dividends categories, i.e. 0 category is defined as 
firms that did not pay dividends and category 5 is defined as firms 
that pay dividends with the highest quintile. It is found that 
monotonic bond lowers the financial constraints that has more 
important and consistent positive effects on firm value relative to 
dividends. These findings imply investors to have higher 
preferences for a firm’s ability to realize good investment projects 
and provide higher future profits, relative to current profit in the 
form of dividends. It also found that non-monotonic connection 
between dividends and firm value and dividends and financial 
constraints have relatively equal positive effect to firm value.  
Keywords: dividend, financial constraints, firm value, information 
asymmetry, signal credibility 
Introduction 
For a growing concern organization, firm profit should be 
distributed to investors or reinvested within the firm to maintain and 
create more future profit. Investors’ value future profit higher than 
historical profit and current profit because future profit is what 
investor will experience in the future. However, estimating future 
profit is difficult. Future condition is vague and full with 
uncertainty. A routine investor practice is to invest and infer future 
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yields based on historical profit trend and current profit, especially 
dividend paid out to investors, and assess the profitability of project 
taken by the firm. Thus, accumulated future profit or dividend is one 
of the major contributions to estimate firm value.  
The theory on how dividend can change firm value starts with 
dividend irrelevant theorem (Miller & Modigliani, 1961). Dividend 
irrelevant theorem operates in the context of perfect capital market 
which information symmetry and frictionless market being the 
prominent feature. Information symmetry means (1) both firm and 
investor have the same information regarding the project 
profitability and (2) both firm and investor do not have information 
advantage relative to each other. Frictionless market enables either 
firm or investor to perform arbitrage activities when there is a 
difference in firm value for an identical firm. The meaning of an 
identical firm is a corporation that has the same stream of future 
profit but differs only that whether the firm which pays dividend and 
a firm which do not pay dividend. 
The dividend irrelevant theorem holds when a firm financed 
solely by equity. The existence of other source of financing, i.e. debt 
financing, that receive special treatment in the form of tax subsidy, 
dividend irrelevant theorem does not hold (Galai & Wiener, 2018). 
Thereby, this special treatment to debt financing provides additional 
value to equity holder when they use more debt relative to equity 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1963). 
As a matter of fact, as we do not live in a perfect capital market, 
so the dividend is always relevant to firm value (Jiang & Stark, 
2013). There are at least 11 theories on dividend relevance to firm 
value (Brawn & Šević, 2018). Dividend relevance to firm value 
theories can be categorized based on investor perspectives, firm 
perspectives, and investor-firm information asymmetry 
perspectives. Theories on dividend relevance to firm value are based 
on investor perspectives (1) catering theory of dividend (Baker et 
al., 2002) that explains the dynamic investor difference over 
preference to dividend and firm cater to investor preference to 
dividend, (2) clientele theory (Allen, Bernardo, & Welch, 2000; 
Duygun, Guney, & Moin, 2018; Graham & Kumar, 2006) discusses 
different investors have stable different preferences for dividend, (3) 
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buyback substitution theory (Bonaimé, Hankins, & Jordan, 2016; 
Jiang, Kim, Lie, & Yang, 2013) which explains investors to  have 
different preferences to firm payout mechanism, i.e. dividend or 
share repurchase, (4) payout distribution channel theory which 
explains the relative importance of net payout rather firm payout 
mechanism (Jain, Shekhar, & Torbey, 2009), (5) conservatism 
theory which explains how investor conservativeness induce 
investor to value current payout rather than future payout, also 
known as a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush theory (Baker 
& Weigand, 2015). 
Theories on dividend relevance based on firm perspectives are 
(6) life cycle theory which explains various life cycles of 
organizations that affects how much dividend that will be distributed 
to investor (Jain et al., 2009), (7) agency cost theory (Firth, Gao, 
Shen, & Zhang, 2016) which explains firm management as an agent 
voluntarily reduced firm free cashflow, i.e. the source of agency 
conflict, in the form of higher dividend payout, (8) leverage trade-
off theory discusses firm agrees to pay dividend, and special 
dividend if  necessary, to maintain firm leverage level in order to 
maintain free cashflow in the firm at minimum level (Cooper & 
Lambertides, 2018), (9) defensive theory (Liu & Chen, 2015) which 
explains the input of a firm and its efforts to reduce their business 
risk by gradually returning cash to shareholders. In addition, 
returning cash will reduce firm management flexibility to choose 
solid investment. Hence, a company will be more careful when it 
chooses investment, (10) payout and initiation theory (Flavin & 
O’Connor, 2017) which explains firm change in stance when they 
shift from one phase of firm life cycle to the next one. When the 
organizations have large profits than their investment opportunities, 
so companies will pay higher dividend (Fama & French, 2002). 
Theories on dividend relevance based on investor and firm 
information asymmetry is (11) signaling or prospective theory 
(Flavin & O’Connor, 2017). Moreover, those firms which uses 
dividend as a signaling mechanism to enhance investor confidence. 
Thereby, it increases dividend to signal firm increased business 
prospective. Off course, based on the opinion on prospects of the 
firm solely relies on a company’s dividend signals which are not 
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enough. Firm dividend is a noisy signal. Firm signal needs to be 
interpreted by investor regarding signal credibility and plausibility.  
Dividend signaling by the firm almost never comes in isolation. 
The signaling of dividends always comes with a smooth 
communication from the very organization which goes with 
dividend changes. Firm communication filling the missing 
information contains changes in dividends (Fairchild, 2010). There 
are different contexts to signal the credibility of a firm, from good 
economic prospect, life cycle of a firm, and firm manager proven 
capability to carry out successful projects. Hence, dividend 
reduction or dividend omission in the context of realizing good 
investment opportunities is not necessarily a bad news (Liang, 
Moreau, & Park, 2011). The dividend reduction and dividend 
omission more prevalent in weak economic condition, firm need to 
preserve their valuable financial resources to realized good 
investment opportunities regardless weak economic condition 
(Alstadsæter, Jacob, & Michaely, 2017; Hull, 2013).  
However, despite a vast array of theories on the relation between 
dividend and firm value offered, empirical findings are relatively 
inconclusive (Araujo, Moreira, & Tsuchida, 2011). Inconclusive 
results may stem from firm deliberate action to smooth their 
dividend payment (Fliers, 2019). To smooth dividends creates an 
artificial positive relationships with future firm performance 
(Karpavičius, 2014). Regulation to make dividend is mandatory and 
also detaches dividend relation to future earnings and reduce the 
information content of dividend (Martins & Novaes, 2012). Those 
firms with poor growth opportunities chose to invest in their own 
stock through its share repurchase activities, in order to reduce 
outstanding shares and in the process increases firm earnings per 
share and maintain dividend streamlining payment mode (Almeida, 
Fos, & Kronlund, 2016).  
The dividend relevance theory which was discussed above has 
also focused on historical dividend and profitability of the projects 
taken. This focus is not complete because it myopically focuses on 
current dividend. The investor needs to see from a broader 
perspective. To complete it, one must also consider large firm 
capabilities and massive investment opportunities. Even though 
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firm has enormous capabilities and investment opportunities, firm 
may not be able to realize all good investment opportunities due to 
firm financial constraints.  
The source of financing may come from internally generated 
funds, i.e. Retained Earnings, and externally sourced fund, i.e. Bank 
Debt and Bond issuance. Investors that provide debt financing have 
greater concern to firm balance sheet. The weaker the balance sheet, 
investor will demand more compensation for higher risk taken in the 
form higher funding costs (Lerskullawat, 2018).  
Other plausible  sources of financing that do not weaken firm 
balance sheet but contribute to stronger firm balance sheet is equities 
financing. However, equities financing is not preferable to firm 
existing shareholder. Equities financing have dilution effect. The 
dilution effect will reduce firm existing shareholder controlling 
power and since controlling power is sometimes more important 
than realization of good investment opportunies, existing firm 
investor may reluctant to invite new investor (Majluf, 1984). 
The theories of dividend have different relationship to firm 
value. Dividend theories from firm and investor perspectives have 
monotonic relationship with firm value. For example, agency cost 
theory of dividend explains dividend as a tool to reduce agency cost. 
Hence, the larger the dividend will increase so do the value of a firm. 
In addition, these theories from information asymmetry have both 
monotonic connection and non-monotonic relationship with firm 
value. Miller and Rock (1985) discussed when weak firm use 
dividend to misled investor regarding their firm future prospect. For 
example, in year 1990, Westinghouse increases dividend in order to 
mimic General Electric dividend and in the process Westinghouse 
sacrificing good investment project, fall into financial distress and 
eventually bankrupt (Grennan, 2019; Martins & Novaes, 2012). 
This Westinghouse dividend have adverse impact to firm value 
(Hanlon & Hoopes, 2014). While strong firm use dividend as a 
signal to increase investor confidence regarding their good future 
prospect. Different firm dividend, good and bad signal when seen as 
a continuum, will resemble a J-Shape relation between dividend and 
firm value (Kim, Park, & Suh, 2018).  
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Our understanding about how dividends affect firm value is 
hindered by (1) the lack of model that integrates two hypothesis, 
signaling or information asymmetry to firm value and financial 
constraints to firm value, and (2) whether the relationship between 
dividend and firm value in the context of firm financial constraints 
is monotonic or non-monotonic. Our paper extends Miller and Rock 
(1985) that discusses firms with high growth potential sacrifice firm 
growth potential by paying dividend, and Kim, Park, and Suh (2018) 
that discuss non-monotonic, i.e. J-Shape, relation between dividend 
and firm value. Integrating two hypothesis and simultaneously test 
monotonic and non-monotonic relations between dividend and firm 
value in the context of firm financial contraints become this paper 
novelty contribution to dividend theory literature. Our research 
questions are as follows: 
1. Does dividend affect firm value? 
2. Do the financial constraints affect firm value? 
3. Does dividend and financial constraints affect firm value? 
4. If dividend do affect firm value, do dividend affect firm value 
in a monotonic relation or a non-monotonic relation in the 
context of firm financial contraints? 
We have chosen public companies of Indonesia from year 2013 
to year 2017 as sample for our research. At first, we have used 
standard panel data regression. However, the data has become 
unbalanced because we eliminate data outliers. The unbalanced 
panel data failed to capture statistically significant relation between 
dividend and firm value. To overcome the unbalance panel data, we 
use repeated cross section regression method for year 2013 to year 
2017.  
Our findings from monotonic and non-monotonic relation 
between dividend and firm value are as follows. From monotonic 
relations perspectives, partial analysis shows dividend have positive 
effect to firm value and lower financial constraints have positive 
effect to firm value. However, simultaneous analysis shows 
dividend effect to firm value becoming statistically insignificant in 
the presence of financial constraints. From non-monotonic relations, 
descriptive statistics analysis based on dividend categorization from 
no dividend paying firm, low dividend paying firm to high dividend 
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paying firm reveal J-Shape relations between dividend and firm 
value. This finding consistent with Kim, Park, and Suh (2018) 
research regarding J-Shape relations between dividend and firm 
value. However, repeated cross section regression shows (1) 
dividend have negative relation to firm value and (2) dividend and 
firm value have relatively non-monotonic relations based on beta 
coefficient values.  
This paper contributes to the literature on the relation between 
dividend and firm value along multiple dimensions. We contribute 
to the relation between dividend and firm value in a monotonic 
perspective literature by highlighting the role of financial constraints 
as a statistically significant mediating variable between dividend 
and firm value. The relation between dividend and firm value in a 
non-monotonic perspective have a relatively have J-Shape relation. 
While, the standard relations between dividend and firm value is 
better represented by monotonic relations, the relatively J-Shape 
relations between dividend and firm value exposes new interesting 
research opportunities. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
In a perfect capital market, firm investment and source of financing 
is available without limitation. Both firm and investor, due to their 
information symmetry, have equal estimate of investment cashflow 
and investment risk. This equal estimate between firm and investor 
creates a symmetry of firm value.  
Relaxing information symmetry into information asymmetry 
asumption creates different investment cashflow and investment 
risk estimate. A firm may have information advantage regarding 
investment cashflow and investment risk relative to investor. 
Thereby, firm information advantage relative to investor result in 
firm more accurate and higher firm valuation relative to investor 
valuation.  
However, an investor that has a wider exposure to different 
industry and exposed to more diverse information may have 
information advantage relative to firm information. If this is the 
case, investor may evaluate whether firm investment due to good 
investment prospect or firm overconfidence. When the investor 
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agrees with the firm regarding investment cashflow and investment 
risk, investor and firm valuation will be equal. However, when 
investor have higher information advantage and decides that firm 
investment is due to firm management overconfidence, investor and 
firm valuation will be different. Firm management overconfidence, 
known as Hubris Hypothesis, will have detrimental effect to future 
firm cashflow and firm risk (F. Jiang, Stone, Sun, & Zhang, 2011). 
Hence, investor valuation will be more accurate and lower than firm 
valuation.  
In this paper, we focus to firm information advantage relative to 
investor. This information advantage creates a wedge of firm 
valuation and investor valuation, which firm valuation is more 
accurate and higher than investor valuation. Undervalued stock have 
several negative consequences to firm activities. First, firm 
increasingly provide managers with stock-based compensation 
through ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plan) (reference). If 
stock price is undervalued, then the incentives effect will not reach 
the intended motivating effect to grow shareholder wealth and 
managerial may take action that have negative effect on firm value 
(Bonaimé et al., 2016).  
Second, firm investment depends on project feasibility and 
available capital to fund the project. Project feasibility is calculated 
based on project cash flow and on discount rate applied to discount 
project cash flow. Project cash flows relatively fixed and beyond 
firm control because of market condition or market competition. 
Sensitivity analysis or scenario analysis only provides information 
how much project cash flow may deviate from expected cash flow. 
Project discount rate is not fixed and firm may reduce the discount 
rate for their advantage. Project discount rate usually calculated with 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  
CAPM tenets is for higher risk must be compensated for higher 
return. This model acknowledges systematic risk and idiosyncratic 
risk. The systematic risk usually goes beyond firm control because 
systematic risk influenced and directly by market condition, 
industry specific risk, and so forth. However, idiosyncratic risk is 
within the firm control. Project idiosyncratic risk maybe reduced 
because firm and investor information asymmetry are reduced.  
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Furthermore, the firm information relative to investor needs to 
be complemented with firm ability to give signal to investor. Signal 
to induce investor to re-evaluate their information set and analysis. 
Investor re-evaluation will reduce firm and investor information 
asymmetry. Firm signal to investor through dividend initiation and 
dividend increase (Lee & Mauck, 2016). The source of funds for 
dividend initiation and dividend increase ideally sourced from firm 
profit and retained earnings. However, firm may increase their debt 
intentionally to fund dividend initiation or dividend increase. Even 
though the firm debt level increased, the post dividend initiation or 
dividend increase, firm idiosyncratic risk remain reduced (Fliers, 
2019).  
Firm idiosyncratic risk also can reduce through higher investor 
demand. Firm life cycle advance from one phase to next phase is 
signaled through dividend initiation or dividend increased (Flavin & 
O’Connor, 2017). When firm life cycle phase advanced, their 
reputation is increased too. Highly reputable firm have broader 
investor based, i.e. mutual fund (Firth et al., 2016). Broader investor 
provides a base to firm with four advantages. First, broader investor 
based will reduce firm information asymmetry and reduce firm cost 
of capital (He, Lepone, & Leung, 2013). Second, dividend initiation 
stock have higher stock movement with other dividend paying stock 
(Hameed & Xie, 2019). Higher stock movement means firm 
idiosyncratic risk is reduced and their stock movement largely 
influenced by stock systematic risk. Third, dividend paying stock 
usually have higher valuation than non-dividend paying stock 
(Karpavičius & Yu, 2018). And fourth, firm with higher investor 
based have lower financial constraints (Driver & Muñoz-Bugarin, 
2019). Lower financial constraints enable firm to execute more good 
investment project than firm with higher financial constraints. Based 
on above argument, our first hypotheses are as follows: 
H1. Dividend has positive effect to firm value. 
Since dividend is desirable from the investor point of view, 
dividend becoming regulated and mandatory. Mandatory dividend 
is a kind of investor protection mechanism. Mandatory dividend 
reduced pool of cash available in the firm that effectively reduced 
agency problem (Martins & Novaes, 2012). However, mandatory 
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dividend for some firm, especially small firm or firm with high 
growth opportunities, have negative side effect (Fama & French, 
2002). Pecking order theory explains how information asymmetry 
has detrimental effect to firm cost of capital. Information asymmetry 
force firm to rely on internally generated fund, i.e. retained earnings, 
as the lowest cost of capital before obtain more costly fund, i.e. bank 
loan and public capital markets.  
Mandatory dividend has negative side effect. Mandatory 
dividend inhibit firm to invest in good project. First reason, 
mandatory dividend reduced retained earnings that force firm to rely 
more on external funding which may not be available. Unavailable 
fund forces firm to abandoned good investment project. Second 
reason, higher needs of external funding is coming with higher cost 
of capital. Higher cost of capital makes it more difficult for project 
to become feasible, i.e. zero or positive Net Present Value. Both 
reasons can be summarized as financial constraints.  
Financial constraints are influenced by external factor and 
internal factor. External factor that influences firm financial 
constraints are financial development. Countries with higher 
financial development level, i.e. financial institution and capital 
market sophistication, reduce the negative impact of firm financial 
constraints to under-investment problem (Lerskullawat, 2018; 
Naeem & Li, 2019). Based on above argument, our second and third 
hypotheses are as follows: 
H2. Lower financial constraints have positive effect to firm value. 
H3. Dividend and financial constraints have effect to firm value. 
As mentioned earlier in our first hypothesis developed regarding 
benefits that can be obtained from higher firm valuation induced by 
dividend initiation or dividend increased, firm have enough 
incentive to mislead investors. Firms have different financial 
constraints level. Firm with low financial constraints will have no 
trouble to pay dividend and realizing good investment project. This 
firm will be highly valued by investors because firm able to provide 
dividend and future profit altogether. Firm with high financial 
constraints usually have higher information asymmetry and at the 
same time, have higher investment opportunities (Fosu, Danso, 
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Ahmad, & Coffie, 2016). Firm with high information asymmetry 
tries to reduce their financial constraints by paying dividend. Firm 
hoped investors to be misled to seen dividend payout as a credible 
signal that firm have move to the next phase of firm life cycle. If 
investors do mislead by firm dividend signal, firm may obtain 
capital needed with lower cost of capital to carry out their 
investment projects. 
However, investors evaluate the credibility of firm signal with 
investors’ previous information. In this paper, we have curtailed the 
information into dividend and financial constraints. Investor will 
consider whether firm financial constraints level enable firm to pay 
dividend without jeopardizing their ability to fund good investment 
projects. Firm with low financial constraints will be able to pay 
dividend and fund their good investment project. Firm with low 
financial constraints have higher signal credibility. The problem of 
underinvestment for firm with low financial constraints is low and 
investor will value the firm more highly. Firm with high financial 
constraints but pay dividend give rise to mismatch between good 
signal from dividend and bad signal from high financial constraints. 
Signal mismatch will reduce the signal credibility. Firm with high 
financial constraints but pay dividend will forego more good 
investment projects. Investors will punish the firm with financial 
constraints but pay dividend with lower firm value.  
Above argument creates two distinct conditions. First, firm with 
low financial constraints and pay out dividend will experience 
positive monotonic relations between dividend and firm value. 
Second, firm with high financial constraints and payout dividend 
will experience negative monotonic relations. Combining the two 
conditions, the relations between dividend and firm value will be 
non-monotonic.  Based on this argument, our fourth hypotheses are 
as follows: 
H4. Dividend has non-monotonic relationship with firm value. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
We obtain financial data from year 2013 to year 2017 to examine 
the relation between dividend and financial constraints to firm value 
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from Bloomberg Terminal. We exclude firms from financial sector 
and firm that have negative earnings. Financial data that we obtain 
have outliers that reduce statistical results. Data outliers eliminated 
using Winsorize method, i.e. exclude 2.5% of data on top and 
bottom. Total firm under consideration presented at table 3.1. below. 
When we exclude firm from financial sector, firm that have negative 
earnings, and excluding outliers, our balance panel data becoming 
unbalance panel data.  
Tabel 1 
Sample 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Registered Public 
Companies 




107 136 139 132 247 
Deduct Outliers 
(5%) 
19 19 19 20 16 
Total Research 
Samples 
360 354 367 387 302 
Source: Bloomberg processed. 
3.2. Methodology 
We perform seven data processing procedure. First, we rank 
firms that do not pay dividend to firm that pay highest dividend. We 
categorize the firm into 6 categories from category 0 to category 1 
to 5. Category 0 is defined as firm that do not pay dividend. Category 
1 is defined as firm that pay dividend with lowest quintile. Category 
5 is defined as firm that pay dividend with highest quintile. The 
number of firms that do not pay dividend i.e. category 0, is different 
with number of firm’s quintile that pay dividend, i.e. category 1 to 
5. Number of firm that pay dividend in each quintile is relatively the 
same. For category 0, we put value of 1 if they do not pay dividend 
and 0 if they pay dividend. For category 1 to 5, we put value of 1 for 
each category and 0 if they belong to other category. Second, we 
calculate Kaplan-Zingales financial constraints equation (Kaplan & 
Zingales, 1997) using firm financial data, i.e. cash flow to capital, 
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Tobin’s Q, debt to total capital, dividend to K (Plant, Property & 
Equipment last year (PP&Et-1)), cash to K (Plant, Property & 
Equipment last year (PP&Et-1)). The first and second procedure 
results is presented in table 2.  
Table 2 
Proxies for Variable 








Tobin’s Q = Total 
Market Value of 
Firm/Total Asset 






























Note: We adjust dividend to total asset by multiplying with 100.000 
to avoid dividend descriptive ratio and regression coefficient results 
0.000.   
KZ Index have negative value. More negative value means 
lower financial constraints. 
Third, matching dividend categories and financial constraints to 
firm value. And fourth, we present the relation between dividend 
categories and firm value in figure. This figure enable us to identify 
whether the relation between dividend and firm value is monotonic 
or non-monotonic.  
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Fourth, we analyze whether dividend and financial constraints 
have effect to firm value using 4 empirical model. The monotonic 
relation between dividend and financial constraints to firm value 
will be analyzed using model 1, model 2, and model 3. The non-
monotonic relation performed using model 4 to model 6. We regress 
5 categories of dividend from category 0, i.e. firm that do not pay 
dividend, dividend category 1, i.e. firm that pay lowest quintile 
dividend to dividend category 4, i.e. firm that pay second highest 
quintile dividend. Since we using 6 categories, our dummy variable 
should be reduced into 5 category and we exclude dividend category 
5. We analyze the non-monotonic relation between dividend and
firm value using model 4. Each categories of dividend have their
own financial constraints value. Performing two bundle of 3
regression model, for monotonic relation and non-monotonic
relation, enable us to understand the role of dividend or financial
constraints as an independent variable, a moderating variable, or a
mediating variable to firm value. The empirical model from model
1 to model 6 presented below:
Model 1. 
𝑄𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Model 2 
𝑄𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Model 3 
𝑄𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 4 
𝑄𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡
Model 5 
𝑄𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 6 
𝑄𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
Fifth, the relation between dividend and financial constraints to 
firm value for period year 2013 to year 2017 normally analyzed by 
standard panel data regression. However, as mention earlier that our 
panel data becoming unbalance panel data because of our earlier 
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data filtering, i.e. firm from financial sector, firm that have negative 
earnings, and excluding outliers, statistical results from standard 
panel data regression is not statistically significant. Hence, we 
change our statistical method to repeated cross section regression. 
We choose this method to identify coefficient value change and their 
statistically significant change within the time period under 
considerations. We perform repeated cross section regression for 
year 2013 to year 2017 and gain 5 regression results for each year.  
Sixth, we test for classical statistical assumptions for each year 
in repeated cross section regression. We find and correct 
heteroscedasticity by using White-Test and robust standard error 
respectively. We conduct multicollinearity test using the VIF 
method.  
Seventh, we present the comparison between the firm value, i.e. 
Tobin’s Q, from descriptive statistic and dividend coefficient 
obtained from repeated cross section for year 2013 to 2017.  
4. Results, Discussion, and Implication for
Future Results 
In this section, we analyze the relation between dividend, firm 
financial constraints, and firm value using descriptive statistics, 
descriptive presentation, regression results, and presentation to 
compare the result on the relation between dividend and firm value 
using descriptive statistics and coefficient results from regression 
equation. 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of firm value, 
dividend, and financial constraints for year 2013 to year 2017. The 
table show firm valuation as proxied by Tobin’s Q relatively stable 
with ratio above 1.8. However, two year after Indonesia President 
Election in year 2014, Tobin’s Q decline considerably and reach 
lowest point in year 2015 with ratio 1.7 and then increase to 1.74 in 
year 2016.  
Indonesia firm dividend relative to their asset show consistent 





2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Tobin’s Q 1.8244*** 1.8625*** 1.6988*** 1.7429*** 1.8662*** 
DIV/TA 0.8348*** 0.8359*** 0.7366*** 0.8937*** 1.0936*** 
KZ Index -86573 -2.7683 -2.0730 -2.9858 -12.3478
DIV0 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DIV1 0.0409*** 0.0426*** 0.0276*** 0.0507*** 0.0571*** 
DIV2 0.1512*** 0.1591*** 0.1199*** 0.2029*** 0.1792*** 
DIV3 0.4810*** 0.4172*** 0.3371*** 0.6182*** 0.5016*** 
DIV4 1.3152*** 1.2917*** 1.0844*** 1.7194*** 1.2678*** 
KZ0 -12,461 0.1703 0.2377 -0.0093 -0.5905
KZ1 -1,827 -0.7078 -1.3032 -1.0272 -1.4975**
KZ2 -1,061 -2.8089** -3.7874** -6.4102** -4.6612**
KZ3 -821,41 -5.2828*** -2.0800** -3.2043*** -8.1103**
KZ4 -5,136 -8.7029*** -6.7670*** -10.955*** -74.872
Obs 379 373 386 407 318
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is statistically significant at alpha 1%. From non-monotonic 
perspective, positive dividend trend is visible and significant at 
alpha 1% for first to third quartile dividend category while fourth 
quartile dividend show negative dividend trend.  
On the contrary to firm dividend, firm financial constraint is not 
statistically significant in monotonic perspectives because firm 
financial constraints have very large standard deviation. However, 
from non-monotonic perspective, firm financial constraint is mostly 
statistically different from zero for firm with dividend category 
second quartile and third quartile. This two quartile show most 
improvement in financial constraints reduction from year 2013 to 
year 2017. While first quartile and fourth quartile dividend category 
show firm financial constraints is not consistent and not statistically 
significant from zero. This inconsistency also happen because firm 
financial constraints have very large standard deviation. 
4.2. Regression Results 
4.2.1. Monotonic relation between dividend and firm value. 
Table 4.2. shows the regression results from model 1 to model 3 on 
the monotonic relation between dividend and financial constraints 
to firm value. Regression results from model 1 show dividend 
growing importance to firm value. Dividend coefficient and 
explanatory power is increasing. Dividend coefficient growing from 
0.0936 in year 2013 to 0.1080 in year 2017 with R-Square 
increasing from 1.92% to 2.19% respectively. Regression results 
from model 2 also show growing importance of financial 
constraints. Financial constraint coefficient and explanatory power 
is increasing. Financial constraints coefficient growing from -
0.0327 in year 2014 and reach -0.0577 in year 2016 with R-Square 
increasing from 0.3% to 1.85% respectively. Partial analysis shows 
that both dividend and financial  constraints have positive and 
growing explanatory power to firm value. However, regression 
results from model 3 shows financial constraints is a mediating 
variable between dividend and firm value. Regression results from 
model 3 show dividend do not have consistent relation with firm 
value in the present of financial constraints. Financial constraints, 
for the last three year from year 2015 to year 2017, is statistically 
significant but have inverted U-Shape coefficients. 
Table 4 
The Monotonic Relation between Dividend and Financial Constraints to Firm Value 
Description 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Model 1 
Div 0.09363*** 0.0848*** 0.0354 0.0867*** 0.1080*** 
Constant 1.7463*** 1.7916*** 1.6467*** 1.6655*** 1.7480*** 
R-Square 0.0192 0.0173 0.0014 0.0189 0.0219 
Model 2 
KZ 0.000 -0.0327*** -0.0503 -0.0577*** -0.0023**
Constant 1.8265*** 1.7720*** 1.5945*** 1.5705*** 1.8377***
R-Square 0.0003 0.0176 0.0313 0.0857 0.0185 
Model 3 
Div 0.0936*** 0.0470 0.0146 0.0182 0.1050*** 
KZ 0.000 -0.0192 -0.0486*** -0.0555*** -0.0022**
Constant 1.7484*** 1.7699*** 1.5872*** 1.5608*** 1.7238***
R-Square 0.0195 0.02 0.0315 0.0864 0.0392 
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4.2.2. Non-monotonic relation between dividend and firm 
value. Table 5 shows the regression results from model 4. 
Regression results from model 4 on the non-monotonic relation 
between dividend and firm value show slight explanatory power 
improvement relative to model 1 the monotonic relation between 
dividend and firm value. Model 4 tend to have higher R-Square 
relative to model 1. However, the relation between dividend and 
firm value in model 4 is not robust because no single categories have 
consistent statistical significance. The most consistent relation 
between dividend and firm value is found in category 1, the lowest 
quintile of dividend categories. In dividend category 1, dividend 
tend to have increasing coefficient which mean dividend tend to 
have higher effect to firm value. The higher dividend  paid out, the 
lower firm value Dividend category 2, the second lowest dividend 
category, shows no statistical significance from year 2013 to year 
2017. This dividend category 2 results need to be explored further. 
Table 6 shows the regression results from model 5. Regression 
results from model 5 show relatively similar to model 4, financial 
constraints in the non-monotonic relation is not robust. Different 
dividend categories have no financial constraints pattern as shown 
from dividend coefficient trend and financial constraints coefficient 
trend. For instance, dividend category 1 show relatively volatile but 
growing regression coefficient and statistically significant for year 
2013 to year 2017. While financial constraints for firm in dividend 
category 1 show relatively consistent no statistically significant 
relation between financial constraints and firm value. 
Table 7 show regression results from model 6. Regression 
results from model 6 different results with model 3. In Monotonic 
relation, financial constraints is a mediating variable that diminish 
dividend relation to firm value. In Non-Monotonic relation, both 
dividend and financial constraints have independent relation to firm 
value as shown with R-Square that results from R-Square addition 
from model 4 and model 5.  
Table 5 
Non-monotonic Relation between Dividend and Firm Value 
Description Model 4 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Div 0 -0.4699 -1.1818** -0.4490 -1.9312*** -1.0140**
Div 1 -1.0354* -1.5516** -0.6256 -2.2216*** -1.2820**
Div 2 -0.4354 -0.8932 -0.3488 -1.4092** -0.7720
Div 3 -0.4087 -1.1258* -0.4041 -1.6922*** -1.1833**
Div 4 -0.2764 -0.9898 0.1096 -1.7928*** -1.0980**
Constant 2.277*** 2.9214 2.031*** 3.5242*** 2.7937***
R-Square 0.0105 0.0202 0.0062 0.0507 0.0248 
***, **, * means statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Table 6 
Non-monotonic Relation between Financial Constraints and Firm Value 
Description Model 5 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
KZ 0 0.000 0.1451 0.1222** 0.0041 0.0067 
KZ 1 0.000 -0.0356** -0.0310 -0.0234 0.0249 
KZ 2 0.000 -0.0472 -0.0065 -0.0839*** -0.1181***
KZ 3 0.000 -0.0536** -0.0828 -0.1667*** -0.0148



































































Description Model 5 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Constant 1.8389*** 1.7936*** 1.5402*** 1.6542*** 1.7772 
R-Square 0.0024 0.0396 0.0436 0.0510 0.0694 
***, **, * means statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Table 7  
Non-monotonic Relation between Dividend and Financial Constraints to Firm Value 
Description Model 6 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Div 0 -0.4681 -1.2038* -0.5196 -1.931*** -1.0103**
Div 1 -1.0062* 1.5865** -0.6659 -2.2642*** -1.2740**
Div 2 -0.4162 1.0047 -0.3513 -1.9628*** -1.3650**
Div 3 -0.3874 -1.6153** -0.6842 -2.3421*** -1.3544**
Div 4 -0.2246 -1.2212* -0.6333 -2.1577*** -1.2545**
KZ 0 0.000 0.1457 0.1238** 0.0040 0.0068
KZ 1 0.000 -0.0493*** -0.0368 -0.0414 0.0053
KZ 2 0.000 -0.0397 -0.0008 -0.0863*** -0.1272***
KZ 3 0.000 -0.0927*** -0.0991 -0.2088*** -0.0211
KZ 4 0.000 -0.0266** -0.1232*** -0.0333* -0.0021**
Constant 2.2770*** 2.9214*** 2.031*** 3.5242*** 2.7937***
R-Square 0.0123 0.0621 0.0478 0.1043 0.0990 
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4.3. Non-monotonic Comparison between Descriptive and 
Model 4 Regression Coefficient 
Figure 1 to figure 5 shows the relation between firm value 
obtained from descriptive relation and dividend regression 
coefficient obtained from repeated cross section regression. Form 
the figure below, we can see that the relation between firm value and 
dividend regression coefficient is relatively neat, dividend 
regression coefficient is almost always negative, and the regression 
coefficient is mostly most negative for firm that pay dividend in 
lowest quintile dividend category. 
Figure 1. Comparison between descriptive and model 4 
regression coefficient in year 2013 
Figure 2. Comparison between descriptive and model 4 
regression coefficient in year 2014 
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Figure 3. Comparison between descriptive and model 
4 regression coefficient in year 2015 
Figure 4. Comparison between descriptive and model 4 
regression coefficient in year 2016 
Figure 5. Comparison between descriptive and model 4 
regression coefficient in year 2017 
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4.4. Discussion 
Relation between dividend and financial constraints and firm 
value in the context of monotonic relation is growing both on the 
effect and the explanatory power. This results depicts that investors 
have preference for higher dividend and lower financial constraints. 
However, when investor needs to choose between higher dividend 
or lower financial constraints, investor choose lower financial 
constraints. Investor preference for lower financial constraints 
indicate investor value future profit that can be obtained from 
realizing good investment project relative to current dividend.  
Even though both dividend and financial constraints have 
independent effect to firm value in the non-monotonic relation 
context, dividend have significantly negative regression coefficient 
relative to financial constraints positive regression coefficient. This 
results shows within each dividend categories, investor show lower 
preferences for higher dividend relative lower financial constraints 
and dividend have more negative effect to firm value relative to 
positive effect of firm financial constraints to firm value. Higher 
dividend in each dividend categories have lower firm value. Lower 
financial constraints in each dividend categories is associated with 
higher firm value.  
The findings contradict with monotonic and non-monotonic on 
the relation between dividend and firm value are as follows. First, in 
monotonic relation, dividend has positive relation to firm value, 
while in non-monotonic relation dividend in each dividend 
categories have negative relation to firm value. Second, in 
monotonic relation, financial constraints is a mediating variable 
while in non-monotonic relation both dividend and financial 
constraints have independent effect to firm value. The fundamental 
difference between monotonic and non-monotonic testing lies in the 
data differences. Monotonic relation use quantitative data. While 
non-monotonic relation use dummy variable. 
The financial constraints results in consistent for both monotonic 
and non-monotonic relation and also interesting. The Indonesian 
stock market within year 2013 to year 2017 have higher number of 
IPO firms, higher market capitalization, and higher stock turnover. 
Moreover, the progress of Indonesian stock market indicates a more 
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developed stock market. Higher importance of financial constraints 
means more developed stock market which would not reduce firm 
difficulties to obtain external financing.  
The relation between dividend and financial constraints to firm 
value in 2015 in non-monotonic relation shows that only non 
dividend paying and second highest quintile dividend categories 
have significant statistics results both on dividend and financial 
constraints. Investors have higher preference for firm that maintain 
their cash by not paying dividend and dividend paying firm that have 
lower financial constraints. Maintaining lower financial constraints 
is needed because higher regulation uncertainty by the new 
Indonesian President and business confidence reach their lowest 
level in 2015. See figure 4.6. below. 
 
Figure 6. Indonesia business confidence Source: 
www.tradingeconomics.com  
4.5. Implication for Future Research 
As discussed earlier, financial constraints do not diminish even 
though stock market is more developed. More research is needed to 
understand which variable which may explain high financial 
constraints in more developed stock markets. More research is 
needed to explain different shapes of non-monotonic relationship 
between dividend and firm value across time period under 
consideration. 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between 
dividend and financial constraints to firm value in monotonic and 
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non-monotonic relation context. The results of this study indicates 
that lower financial constraints have more positive effect to firm 
value relative to dividend. These results are consistent both on 
monotonic and non-monotonic context. Thus, we can conclude that 
investor has higher preference for future profit relative to current 
profit, i.e. dividend.  
The relation between dividend and firm value is better explained 
by monotonic relation. However, non-monotonic relation between 
dividend and firm provides a rich context. As shown in year 2015, 
investor gives good firm value for firm that choose not to pay 
dividend in order to protect cash as the valuable resources to realize 
good investment projects. The Investor also gives good firm value 
for firm that chooses to pay dividend if paying dividend do not have 
a negative effect to firm abilities to realize good investment projects.  
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